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Abstract 
We examine the joint impact of investors’ trading horizons and public information on trading 
volume. We hypothesize that public information leads to relative homogenization in the traders’ 
beliefs about the fundamental value of an asset and this reduces their disagreement regarding the 
fundamental value. Since the long-horizon traders’ trade is motivated by the fundamental value, 
such reduced disagreement leads to a reduction in trading volume. We further hypothesize that 
public information leads to polarization in the traders’ beliefs about other traders’ beliefs about the 
fundamental value and this polarization increases disagreement regarding other traders’ beliefs 
about the fundamental value. Since short-horizon traders’ trade is motivated by other traders’ 
beliefs about the fundamental value, such increased disagreement leads to an increase in trading 
volume. We test these hypotheses in an experimental asset market and find strong evidence in their 
support. 
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1. Introduction 
 The distinction between short-horizon and long-horizon traders could potentially lie at the 
heart of many puzzling phenomena. Long-horizon traders hold their positions until the 
fundamentals of the firm become public, while short-horizon traders move frequently in and out 
of stocks in anticipation of short-term price fluctuations in the market. This difference in trading 
strategies implies that long-horizon traders form beliefs about the fundamentals of a firm, while 
short-horizon traders form beliefs of other traders’ beliefs of the firm’s fundamentals. The latter 
beliefs are known in the literature as higher order beliefs. Higher order beliefs and fundamental 
beliefs don’t always coincide, so it is important to study how differences between them impact 
observable phenomena and social welfare. For example, it is widely believed that corporate 
myopia is due to a large presence of short-horizon traders in the market. While this phenomenon 
has been empirically documented, it remains puzzling because it is unclear why a sequence of 
short-horizon traders, each concerned only with the price at which they could sell to the next 
generation of short-horizon traders, would result in short-term prices that do not reflect long-term 
cash flows. 
In this paper, we provide experimental evidence regarding the role of short-horizon and 
long-horizon traders in another puzzling phenomenon: the enormous trading volume that is 
observed in capital markets1. It is highly unlikely that the observed trading volume is entirely due 
to consumption and savings needs. Neither can it be explained by the mere volatility of 
fundamentals, because if a shock to fundamentals caused all traders’ beliefs to be revised in the 
 
1 Early evidence on abnormal trading volume around earnings announcement comes from Beaver (1968), Bamber 
(1987), Kandel and Pearson (1995). More recent results re-affirm this using data from high-frequency trading (Fleming 
and Remolona (1999), Green (2004), Evan and Lyons (2008), Chae (2005), Krinsky and Lee (1996). 
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same way then stock prices would change without much accompanying trade. So, the prevailing 
wisdom is that a large part of the observed trading volume is caused by disagreement among traders 
and is speculative in nature. But the disagreement that explains trading volume is unlikely to be 
disagreement about firms’ fundamentals because such a story is inconsistent with the robust 
empirical finding that public releases of news (such as earning announcements) are followed by 
large increases in trading volume. Public information about fundamentals would homogenize 
beliefs about fundamentals and reduce disagreement rather than increase it.  
So, we hypothesize that a significant part of the observed trading volume is due to the 
presence of short-horizon traders who are concerned not directly with predicting changes in the 
fundamentals but with changes in the beliefs of other traders. What causes disagreement among 
short-horizon traders about the beliefs of other traders? How does the release of public information 
result in increased disagreement about the beliefs of other traders while at the same time causing 
fundamental beliefs to converge?   
To illustrate what is involved, consider a situation where traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 form beliefs about 
trader 𝑘′𝑠 (Susan’s) beliefs, with Susan concerned only with beliefs about the fundamentals of a 
firm. Traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 are short-horizon traders who will need to ultimately liquidate their holdings 
by trading with Susan, who is a long-horizon trader concerned about the firm’s fundamentals. If 
these short-horizon traders disagree about Susan’s beliefs, they will also disagree about the price 
at which Susan would be willing to buy or sell to them, and therefore they would trade among 
themselves before liquidating their holdings to Susan.  Let 𝜃 represent the firm’s fundamentals 
and suppose that prior beliefs about 𝜃 are described by the improper uniform distribution over the 
entire real line. Consider noisy signals of the form ?̃? = 𝜃 + 𝜀̃, where 𝜀̃ is distributed Normal with 
mean 0 and precision 𝛽, so that 𝐸(?̃?|𝑥) = 𝑥.  Now, suppose that each of the three traders receives 
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idiosyncratic, but i.i.d., draws of ?̃?: ?̃?𝑖 = 𝜃 + 𝜀?̃?, ?̃?𝑗 = 𝜃 + 𝜀?̃? and ?̃?𝑘 = 𝜃 + 𝜀?̃?. Then 𝐸𝑙(?̃?|𝑥) =
𝑥𝑙, 𝑙 = 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, so that traders have different assessments of the firm’s fundamentals. But, more 
importantly for our discussion, trader 𝑖′𝑠 and trader 𝑗′𝑠 beliefs about Susan’s beliefs of the 
fundamentals are described by 𝐸𝑖[𝐸𝑘(?̃?|𝑥𝑘)|𝑥𝑖] = 𝐸(?̃?𝑘|𝑥𝑖) = 𝐸(?̃?|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖 and, similarly, 
𝐸𝑗[𝐸𝑘(?̃?|𝑥𝑘)|𝑥𝑗] = 𝑥𝑗. So, there is disagreement in higher order beliefs measured by |𝑥𝑖 −𝑥𝑗|. But, 
now let us introduce a public signal ?̃? = 𝜃 +  ?̃?, where ?̃? is independent of 𝜀̃ and is distributed 
Normal with 0 mean and precision 𝛼. How does the public signal affect the disagreement in higher 
order beliefs? The fundamental beliefs of Susan are now described by 𝐸(?̃?|𝑥𝑘, 𝑦) =
𝛼𝑦+𝛽𝑥𝑘
𝛼+𝛽
, so 
that the difference in higher order beliefs of traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 is:  
(
𝛽
𝛼 + 𝛽
) |𝐸(?̃?𝑘|𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸(?̃?𝑘|𝑥𝑗)| = (
𝛽
𝛼 + 𝛽
) |𝐸(?̃?|𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸(?̃?|𝑥𝑗)| = (
𝛽
𝛼 + 𝛽
)
2
|𝑥𝑖 −𝑥𝑗|
< |𝑥𝑖 −𝑥𝑗| 
Thus, in a setting where all traders receive conditionally independent signals of the 
fundamentals, public information decreases the disagreement in both fundamental beliefs and 
higher order beliefs. Such information environments cannot explain the increase in trading volume 
following the release of public information, even in the presence of short-horizon traders. 
But, consider the following information environment. Let ?̃? be the private signal received 
by Susan (the long-horizon trader), let ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑗 be the private signals of the two short-horizon 
traders and let ?̃? be the public signal observed by all traders. Let ?̃? be generic notation for the 
signals received by short-horizon traders. Suppose that, absent the public signal, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?, ?̃?) = 0. 
This implies that the information received by short-horizon traders contains no information about 
Susan’s valuation of the asset and therefore would cause no disagreement and no trade among 
short-horizon traders.  But now suppose the public signal is such that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?, ?̃?|𝑦) ≠ 0, i.e., the 
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public signal induces a relationship between the private signals of short-horizon and long-horizon 
traders. Then the release of the public signal will cause short-horizon traders to disagree about 
Susan’s beliefs, while in the absence of the public signal there will be no such disagreement. A 
particularly interesting case arises when 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?, ?̃?|𝑦) < 0. Then short-horizon trader 𝑖 could be 
more optimistic than short-horizon trader 𝑗 about the firm’s fundamentals, but more pessimistic 
about Susan’s beliefs of the fundamentals. Thus, given the public signal, trader 𝑖 would purchase 
from trader 𝑗 if these traders are long-horizon traders, but trader 𝑖 would sell to trader 𝑗 if they are 
short-horizon traders. Also, in the absence of public information there would be no trade if traders 
are short-horizon traders, even though they disagree in their beliefs about the firm’s fundamentals. 
But, if traders are long-horizon traders, there will be trading volume under exactly the same 
informational conditions. 
Since beliefs are not directly observable, but trading volumes are a direct consequence of 
differences in beliefs, experimental tests built around trading volumes could yield insights into 
how economic agents could come to disagree in terms of fundamental beliefs and higher order 
beliefs, and how fundamental beliefs and higher order beliefs could diverge sharply from each 
other. Such experiments would also provide insights into the role of short-horizon traders in 
driving trading volumes. Our goal, in this paper, is to provide such insights. 
 
2.  Theory and Hypothesis 
 Our experimental design is based on the theory of trading volume developed by Kondor 
(2012). We outline the relevant part of Kondor’s theory below and identify testable hypothesis. 
Kondor assumes that there are two groups of traders, A-traders and B-traders. A-traders are long-
horizon traders and arrive late in the market after B-traders have finished trading among 
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themselves. A-traders hold their shares until the firm pays out an uncertain liquidating dividend, 
and are therefore concerned with assessing the amount of the liquidating dividend. B-traders are 
short- horizon traders who can trade among themselves in a market in which A-traders are absent, 
but who must ultimately liquidate their holdings to A-traders. They do not have the option of 
holding their shares until the firm liquidates, and therefore the value that a B-trader assigns to the 
firm depends on his/her beliefs of A-traders’ average valuation, and therefore upon his/her beliefs 
of A- traders average beliefs of the firm’s liquidating dividend.   
The liquidating value of the firm (its fundamental value) is the sum of two independent 
components: ?̃? = ?̃?𝐴 + ?̃?𝐵. Assume that each component is distributed Normal with means of 𝜇𝐴 
and 𝜇𝐵, variances 𝜎𝐴
2 and 𝜎𝐵
2, respectively, and that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐴, ?̃?𝐵) = 0.  Let Susan be a 
representative A-trader and let 𝑖 and 𝑗 be representative B-traders. Susan receives private 
information on 𝜃𝐴, while 𝑖 and 𝑗 traders receive private signals on 𝜃𝐵. Let ?̃? = 𝜃𝐴 + ?̃? be Susan’s 
private signal, where ?̃? is independent of ?̃?𝐴 and ?̃?𝐵 and is distributed Normal with zero mean and 
variance 𝜎𝛾
2.  Thus, conditional on her private signal, Susan’s belief of the firm’s fundamental 
value is: 
𝐸(𝜃|𝑠) = 𝐸(𝜃𝐴|𝑠) + 𝜇𝐵 = 𝜏𝑠 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜇𝐴 + 𝜇𝐵, where 𝜏 =
𝜎𝐴
2
𝜎𝐴
2+𝜎𝛾
2. 
Let 𝑥𝑖 = 𝜃𝐵 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑥𝑗 = 𝜃𝐵 + 𝜀𝑗 be the private signals of the representative short-horizon traders 𝑖 
and 𝑗, where 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜀𝑗 are i.i.d. draws from a Normal distribution with zero mean and variance 𝜎𝜀
2 
and are independent of ?̃?. Then, 
𝐸(𝜃|𝑥) = 𝐸(𝜃𝐵|𝑥) + 𝜇𝐴 = 𝛼𝑥 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜇𝐵 + 𝜇𝐴, where 𝛼 =
𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝐵
2+𝜎𝜀
2 
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Thus, if traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 were to behave as long-horizon traders, the presence of private signals 
would cause disagreement about the firm’s fundamentals, with the magnitude of disagreement 
described by: 
|𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑗)| =
𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝐵
2+𝜎𝜀
2 |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗|     (1) 
But, suppose traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 are short-horizon traders who cannot hold their positions until the firm 
pays out its liquidating dividend and have to settle up their trades with Susan. Thus, because 𝜃𝐴 is 
independent of 𝜃𝐵, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(?̃?, ?̃?) = 0, so the private signals observed by traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 are 
uninformative about Susan’s information signal and therefore there is no disagreement about 
Susan’s beliefs. More precisely,  
𝐸[𝐸(𝜃|𝑠)|𝑥𝑖] − 𝐸[𝐸(𝜃|𝑠)|𝑥𝑗] = 𝜏[𝐸(𝑠|𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸(𝑠|𝑥𝑗)] = 𝜏[𝐸(𝜃𝐴|𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸(𝜃𝐴|𝑥𝑗)] = 0  
       (2) 
Thus, there is no reason for these short-horizon traders to speculate about Susan’s valuation and 
no reason to trade among themselves before liquidating their holdings to Susan.  The above 
analysis implies the following hypothesis for the information environment described here: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Private information about fundamentals causes disagreement and trade if traders 
have long-term horizons, but no disagreement and no trade if traders have short-term horizons. 
Now, suppose that in addition to the private signals described above, all traders receive a 
public signal. The public signal provides noisy information about the aggregate quantity 𝜃, i.e. 
information about the sum of 𝜃𝐴 and 𝜃𝐵.  Conditional on 𝜃, 𝜃𝐴 and 𝜃𝐵 are no longer independent: 
a higher 𝜃𝐴 implies a lower 𝜃𝐵 and a lower 𝜃𝐴 implies a higher 𝜃𝐵, i.e.,  𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐴, ?̃?𝐵|𝜃) < 0, while 
the unconditional covariance 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐴, ?̃?𝐵) = 0. This negative covariance carries over to noisy 
signals.  Let ?̃? = 𝜃 +  ?̃?  be the public signal, where ?̃? is distributed Normal with mean 0 and 
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variance  𝜎𝜂
2 and is independent of all the other noise terms. Then, while the unconditional 
covariance 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?, ?̃?) = 0, the conditional variance 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?, ?̃?|𝑦) < 0, as shown below: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠, 𝑥|𝑦) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠, 𝑥) −
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠, 𝑦)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
= −
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝜃)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐵, 𝜃)
𝜎𝐴
2 + 𝜎𝐵
2 + 𝜎𝜂2
= −
𝜎𝐴
2𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝐴
2 + 𝜎𝐵
2 + 𝜎𝜂2
< 0 
Public information of this kind connects the private signals of short-horizon traders to the 
private signals of long- horizon traders. So, in the presence of the public signal, traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 can 
make inferences about Susan’s value for the asset, while in the absence of public information no 
such inferences are possible.  
Proposition 1: The presence of public information causes short-horizon traders to disagree about 
the beliefs of long-horizon traders.   
Proof: Susan’s value for the asset conditional on her private information and the public signal is:  
𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦) = 𝐸(𝜃) + 𝑏[𝑠 − 𝐸(𝑠)] + 𝑐[𝑦 − 𝐸(𝑦)] 
= 𝑐𝑦 + (1 − 𝑐)(𝜇𝐴 + 𝜇𝐵) + 𝑏(𝑠 − 𝜇𝐴), 
where 
𝑏 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠, 𝜃)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝜃)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑠)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑠)
=
𝜎𝜂
2
𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝐵
2 
and,  
𝑐 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝜃)𝑉𝑆𝑎𝑟(𝑠) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑠, 𝜃)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑠)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑠)
=
𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝐵
2 
Using the fact that 𝑏 + 𝑐 = 1, 𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦) can be expressed as: 
𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦) = 𝑏(𝑠 + 𝜇𝐵) + (1 − 𝑏)𝑦      (3) 
Then the disagreement among short-horizon traders about Susan’s valuation is: 
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|𝐸[𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦)|𝑥𝑖, 𝑦] − 𝐸[𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦)|𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦]| = 𝑏|𝐸(𝑠|𝑥𝑖, 𝑦) − 𝐸(𝑠|𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦)|
= 𝑏|𝐸(𝜃𝐴|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦) − 𝐸(𝜃𝐴|𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦)| 
But, 𝐸(𝜃𝐴|𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐸(𝜃𝐴|𝑦) +
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴,𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥|𝑦)
[𝑥 − 𝐸(𝑥|𝑦)] 
Cancelling common terms, the disagreement about Susan’s valuation is: 
|𝐸[𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦)|𝑥𝑖, 𝑦] − 𝐸[𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦)|𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦]| = 𝑏 (
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥|𝑦) ) |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗| (4) 
It follows that if the private signals of traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 do not coincide, the presence of public 
information will cause disagreement about Susan’s valuation, causing them to trade with each 
other, while in the absence of public information traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 will not trade because they agree 
about Susan’s valuation.   Additionally, since 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝑥|𝑦) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝜃𝐵|𝑦) < 0, if 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑥𝑗 
trader 𝑖 would be more optimistic than trader 𝑗 about the fundamentals of the firm but more 
pessimistic about Susan’s assessment of those fundamentals.  Thus, trader 𝑖 would purchase from 
trader 𝑗 if both traders were long-horizon traders, but trader 𝑖 would sell to trader 𝑗 if both traders 
are short-horizon traders.  
Now, suppose that traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 trade as if they are long-horizon traders concerned only 
with the firm’s fundamentals. We show below that in this case, public information causes 
disagreements to decline, rather than to increase.  
 
Proposition 2:  |𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦) − 𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦)| < |𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑗)|   (5) 
Proof: Proof in Appendix A. 
 
Hypothesis 2 below follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. 
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Hypothesis 2:  The presence of public information in settings where all traders also receive 
private signals will cause trading volume to decrease if traders have long-term horizons, but will 
cause trading volume to increase if traders have short-term horizons.  
 
 In the Kondor (2012) paper, traders extract information from the equilibrium price in the 
capital market in addition to the information provided by the signals described above. Since the 
equilibrium price aggregates the information of all traders it could possibly become a sufficient 
statistic for all the idiosyncratic information that traders receive, in which case beliefs would 
become homogenous with or without public information.  However, Kondor shows that with the 
introduction of independent supply noise, Hypothesis 1 and 2 are essentially preserved even when 
traders condition on equilibrium prices.  In our experimental design, we do not explicitly introduce 
supply side noise, but we believe that, as a practical matter, there will always be some naturally 
occurring noise in any experimental implementation due to unpredictable differences in 
experimentation and learning by the participants in the study.  Given this claim, we interpret the 
data from our experiment as if participants do not condition on equilibrium prices.  Since we are 
not testing predictions about the magnitudes of trading volumes, but only about the ordering of 
trading volumes, such interpretation is valid in view of the Kondor (2012) result that when supply 
noise is present, the qualitative nature of the results are the same regardless of whether traders 
condition or don’t condition on equilibrium prices.   
 
3. Experimental Parameters 
For experimental purposes, we make three simplifications to the theory described above.  
First, we provide perfect information, rather than noisy information, about 𝜃𝐴 to Susan, i.e. in the 
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experiment, 𝑠 ≡ 𝜃𝐴. Second, we provide the public signal ?̃? = 𝜃 +  ?̃? to all B-traders, but hide this 
information from Susan. Thus, Susan’s valuation of the firm is simply: 𝐸(𝜃|𝜃𝐴) = 𝜃𝐴 + 𝜇𝐵. This 
is equivalent to forcing 𝑏 = 1 in the more general expression 𝐸(𝜃|𝑠, 𝑦) = 𝑏(𝑠 + 𝜇𝐵) + (1 − 𝑏)𝑦 
that was derived in (3).  Substituting 𝑏 = 1 in equation (4), the disagreement, caused by public 
information, among A-traders about Susan’s valuation of the firm becomes (
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥|𝑦) ) |𝑥𝑖 −
𝑥𝑗|. Thus, by hiding the public signal from Susan we have magnified the disagreement among 
short-horizon traders and have increased saliency in the experiment. The third simplification we 
make is to replace Susan by a computer program that simply pays B-traders the value of ?̃?𝐴 that is 
realized in that trial of the experiment plus the constant 𝜇𝐵 in exchange for any shares they may 
wish to sell to Susan, after trading among themselves. All three simplifications either reduce the 
complexity of the inferences that participants in the experiment need to make or increase saliency 
in payoffs, without damaging the hypotheses that we wish to test.    
We use the following parameter values in our experiment: 
𝜇𝐴 = 𝜇𝐵 = 50 
𝜎𝐴
2 = 𝜎𝐵
2 = 100 
𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝜂
2 = 25 
We preserve Normalcy of all random variables, as specified in the theory.    
Given these parameter values, we calculate below the disagreement parameters in each of 
our settings: 
𝛼 =
𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝐵
2+𝜎𝜀
2 = 0.8   
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃, 𝑥|𝑦) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃, 𝑥) −
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃,𝑦)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥,𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
= 𝜎𝐵
2 −
(𝜎𝐴
2+𝜎𝐵
2)𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝐴
2+𝜎𝐵
2+𝜎𝜂
2 = 11.1112  
11  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥|𝑦) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥) −
𝐶𝑜𝑣2(𝑥,𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
= 𝜎𝐵
2 [1 −
𝜎𝐵
2
𝜎𝐴
2+𝜎𝐵
2+𝜎𝜂
2] + 𝜎𝜀
2 = 80.5555  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝑥|𝑦) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝜃𝐴) −
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴,𝑦)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥,𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦)
= −
𝜎𝐵
2𝜎𝐴
2
𝜎𝐴
2+𝜎𝐵
2+𝜎𝜂
2 = −44.4444  
Therefore: 
The disagreement among long-horizon traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 with private information only is 
𝛼|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗| = 0.8|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗|. 
The disagreement among short-horizon traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 with private information only is 0. 
The disagreement among long-horizon traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 with private and public information 
is (
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃, 𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥|𝑦) ) |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗| = (0.1379)|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗|. 
The disagreement among short-horizon traders 𝑖 and 𝑗 with private and public information 
is (
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥|𝑦) ) |𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗| = −(0.5517)|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗|. 
The above parameters imply that 𝑥 ∈ 50 ± 2√125 = 50 ± 22.36, with 95% confidence. 
Therefore, the difference in 𝑖 and 𝑗 traders’ private signals ≤ 44.72. This, in turn, implies that the 
first-order disagreement without public information ≤ 0.8 × 44.72 = 35.78 while the first-order 
disagreement with public information ≤ 0.1379 × 44.72 = 6.17. Similarly, the second-order 
disagreement without public information is 0 while the second-order disagreement with public 
information ≤ 0.5517 × 44.72 = 24.67. 
 
4. Experiment Design 
 In the experiment, a group of ten participants traded shares of one stock in thirteen 
independent trading periods. Orders were restricted to a single share. The stock paid a liquidating 
dividend at the end of the trading period. The participants did not know the amount of the dividend 
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until after the trading period, but they received signals (clues) about the dividend before trading in 
the market commenced. 
The timeline for the experiment is given in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Timeline of the Experiment 
 
There were two treatment variables. The first, public information, was either Available or 
Not Available. The second, trading horizon of the human traders, was either Long or Short. If 
trading horizon was Long, then the shares held by participants at the end of the trading period were 
liquidated at the realized dividend value. If trading horizon was Short, then the shares held by the 
human participants were liquidated at the price the computerized trader (Susan) was willing to 
pay for the shares. In essence, short-horizon traders were required to sell their shares to the 
computerized trader at the end of each trading period. Depending upon the treatment, public 
information was or was not be available to the long and short-horizon human traders. Note that the 
computerized trader did not receive a public signal in the Public Information treatments. The 2 X 
2 design may be summarized as follows. 
  Public Information 
  Available Not Available 
Trading 
Horizon 
Long   
Short   
Figure 2 – Experimental Treatments 
Trading 
in double 
auction 
(4 mins) 
Receive the 
signals 
about the 
dividend 
Dividend realized; 
payoffs on share 
holdings distributed 
Pre-trading 
forecast 
(30 secs) 
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We ran three sessions of each of the four experimental treatments, with each session 
consisting of 13 trading periods. We generated three sets of thirteen securities with dividend, two 
private signals and a public signal. We used the three sets respectively for the three sessions of 
each of the four treatments. This ensures that all sessions (even across treatments) were 
informationally identical. Note that for each trading period, we generated two private signals – 
one-half of the participants received the first private signal and the other half received the second 
private signal. 
The short-horizon traders were asked to forecast the price the computerized trader would 
be willing to pay while the long-horizon traders were asked to forecast the dividend value. 
Soliciting the pre-trading forecasts allows us to directly measure the extent of disagreement among 
the traders. 
The price the computerized trader would pay would be equal to the expected value of the 
dividend given their information set. Also, the dividend components drawn for a trading period 
were independent of the dividend components drawn for every other trading period.  
At the beginning of each trading period, participants were endowed with a certain number 
of shares and a certain amount of experimental dollars. Each trading period lasted for four minutes. 
Trading was organized as a continuous double auction. A participant’s shares were liquidated at 
the end of each trading period at the pre-defined liquidating value. Recall that the liquidating value 
corresponded to the realized dividend in the long-horizon treatments and to the amount the 
computerized trader was willing to pay in the short-horizon treatments. A participant’s trading 
profit in a period corresponded to the difference between their ending cash balance (post-
liquidation of shares) and their initial portfolio value (with shares valued at 100). 
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Cash and stock holdings did not carry over from one period to the next. At the beginning 
of each trading period, participants received fresh endowments of shares and cash. At any point, 
participants could not sell more shares than they owned and could not bid for more shares than 
their cash holding allowed. 
The first of the thirteen trading periods was treated as a practice trading period, and 
participants were not compensated for it. The trading profits and the liquidating value of 
shareholdings in the last twelve trading periods were converted into cash at a pre-announced 
exchange rate2. The participants were also paid for their trading forecasts per the following 
formula: max {0, 2500 – 0.25× [forecast – liquidating value]2}.  
After the participants signed in, hard-copy instructions were distributed. The participants 
read the instructions and then answered a quiz. The answers were reviewed and the participants 
were paid 25 cents for every correct answer. The participants were recruited from the subject pool 
at the Economic Science Institute Laboratory at Chapman University. All participants received a 
show-up payment of seven dollars.  
5.   Results  
We ran three sessions of each of the four experimental treatments. As each session was 
comprised of twelve trading periods, there are thirty-six observations for each of the four 
treatments. The results reported below are based on these thirty-six observations. We recognize 
that the twelve observations from a single session are not independent as they involve repeated 
measures arising from the same participants trading with each other in twelve consecutive trading 
periods. We control for this in our regression analyses through the use of fixed effects for periods 
(see below). Trading volume can be measured either as the quantity traded or as the quantity traded 
 
2 The study was approved by the Institutional Review Boards at Chapman University and University of California – 
Irvine.  
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times the price at which it was traded (dollar trading volume). Tables 1 and 2 report the results 
using both metrics though the following discussion is restricted to quantity traded for ease of 
exposition. Recall that each trading period lasted for four minutes. All analyses reported in Tables 
1 and 2 were conducted twice – once on full set of data generated from all four minutes and once 
on the subset of data restricted to the last two minutes of each trading period. Again, for ease of 
exposition the following discussion focuses on the results generated from using all four minutes 
of trading period data.  
5.1 Trading Volume in Private Information Sessions 
Our first hypothesis states that, in the absence of public information, private information 
causes long-horizon traders to trade, while it induces a no trade scenario among short-horizon 
traders. This no trade prediction is stark, and we do not expect it to hold true in the laboratory. 
Thus, armed solely with private information, we expect long-horizon traders to trade more than 
short-horizon traders. Consistent with this, the aggregate trading volume among long-horizon 
traders with private information is 3304 units while it drops sharply to 1197 units among short-
horizon traders with private information (Table 1, Panel A). To test the significance of this 
difference in trading volumes, we aggregated the trading volume for the first four trading periods 
and for the last four trading periods of each sessions. Treating these two sums as independent 
observations yields six observations per treatment. A Wilcoxon signed rank test on these six 
observations shows that long-horizon traders react differently to private information than short-
horizon traders. Indeed, long-horizon traders generated significantly greater trading volume than 
short-horizon traders (Table 2, Panel C). 
5.2 Trading Volume in Public Information Sessions 
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Our second hypothesis also suggests a difference in trading behavior between long-horizon 
and short-horizon traders when they receive a public signal in addition to their respective private 
signals. While long-horizon traders are expected to engage in fewer trades, short-horizon traders 
are expected to trade more frequently. Consistent with this, the aggregate trading volume among 
long-horizon traders drops to 1368 units (Public Information Available treatment) from 3304 units 
(Public Information Not Available treatment), while the aggregate trading volume among short-
horizon traders increases to 1578 units (Public Information Available treatment) from 1197 units 
(Public Information Not Available treatment) (Table 1, Panel A). Regressing3 the long-horizon 
trading volume on the availability of public information shows that the coefficient on the Public 
Information dummy variable (set to 1 if public information is available and zero otherwise) is 
negative and significant (Table 1, Panel C). However, this coefficient is positive and significant 
when considering the trading volume of short-horizon traders (Table 1, Panel D). To further assess 
the difference in trading behavior between long- and short-term traders, we also ran non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Similar to the approach described in Section 5.1, we 
utilized six observations per treatment and found that in the presence of public information, long-
horizon traders engage in significantly fewer trades than when public information is not available 
(Table 2, Panel C).  Analogously, short-horizon traders engage in significantly more trades when 
public information is available than when it is unavailable (Table 2, Panel C). 
Traders’ reactions to the availability of public information seems to be driven by their 
(differing) beliefs of the asset’s liquidating value. While public information leads to a reduction in 
long-horizon traders’ disagreement regarding the liquidating value, it promotes a greater 
disagreement among short-horizon traders. This leads to less trading volume among long-horizon 
 
3 We ran a generalized least squares model with a random effect for session and a fixed effect for each of the thirty-
six trading periods. Standard errors were clustered at the session level. 
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traders and greater trading volume among short-horizon traders. We measure this disagreement in 
two separate ways. First, our experiment allows us to measure this disagreement directly by 
looking at the participants’ forecasts. Recall that there were ten participants in each trading period, 
and two private signals were drawn for each trading period. Five of the participants received the 
high private signal while the other five received the low private signal. The forecasts made by the 
five traders with the low signal were averaged together as were the forecasts made by the five 
traders with the high signal. We measured the disagreement among traders as the absolute 
difference between these two averages. When public information is not available, the average 
disagreement among long-horizon traders is 9.66, and it drops to 4.8 when public information is 
available (Table 3, Panel A). For short-horizon traders, the average disagreement is 9.39 when 
public information is not available and increases to 9.42 when it is available (Table 3, Panel A). 
Note that the availability of public information has a stronger effect on the behavior of long-
horizon traders than short-horizon traders.  
Our second measure of disagreement is the time-weighted bid-ask spread. As there may be 
a within-period learning effect, the time weighted bid-ask spread may be a more sensitive measure. 
When public information is not available, the time weighted bid-ask spread with long-horizon 
traders is 28.48. When public information is available, this measure drops to 9.53 (Table 3, Panel 
B). The time weighted bid-ask spread moves in the opposite direction with short-horizon traders. 
When public information is not available, this spread is 15.59 but it increases to 25.01 when public 
information is available (Table 3, Panel B).  
To assess the significance of these changes in disagreement amongst the long (short)-
horizon traders, both the average disagreement as well as the time weighted bid-ask spread 
measures were regressed against a dummy variable, Public Information, which took value 1 if 
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public information was available and zero otherwise.4 The coefficient on public information in 
both regressions was negative and significant for long-horizon traders (Table 3, Panel C).  This 
coefficient was positive in both regressions for short-horizon traders, though it was only significant 
for the more sensitive time-weighted bid-ask spread measure (Table 3, Panel D). 
Finally, we regressed5 the participant-level trades on the availability of public information. 
It should be hardest to identify the treatment effect at this level because it obviates any kind of 
aggregation thereby allowing for individual participant-level idiosyncrasies to have an effect. The 
signs of the coefficients are as expected (negative for long-horizon traders and positive for short-
horizon traders), though it is only significant for long-horizon traders (Table 5, Panels A and B). 
In summary, we find evidence suggesting long-horizon traders react differently to the availability 
of public information than short-horizon traders. While the availability of public information leads 
to less trading by long-horizon traders, it tends to increase the trading activity of short-horizon 
traders. 
5.3 Additional Analyses 
In this section we report additional analyses regarding the magnitude of price changes and 
the efficiency of prices. In the presence of public information we find that both long-horizon and 
short-horizon traders behave similarly in that the volume-weighted average price is higher for both 
groups (Figure 3, Panels A and B). This suggests that the magnitude of price change is 
unambiguously higher in public information. The mean absolute deviation from the liquidating 
value presents a mixed picture (Figure 4, Panels A and B) in that the availability of public 
 
4 We ran a generalized least squares model with a random effect for session and a fixed effect for each of the thirty-
six trading periods. Standard errors were clustered at the session level. 
 
5 We ran a generalized least squares model with a random effect for subject, a fixed effect for each of the thirty-six 
trading periods and a fixed effect for each of the six sessions. Standard errors were clustered at the subject level. 
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information does not appear to significantly impact the efficiency of prices when considering 
markets solely populated by either long-horizon or short-horizon traders. Note, however, that our 
primary focus is not on the first moment of prices or forecasts, but rather the second moment. 
Accordingly, the variance of both prices and forecasts decreases when public information is 
available for the long-horizon traders but increases when public information is available for the 
short-horizon traders (Table 4). 
6. Conclusion 
We provide experimental evidence on the differential impact public information has on the 
trading volume generated by short-horizon and long-horizon traders. When these traders have only 
private information, we find that the trading volume generated by long-horizon traders is an order 
of magnitude higher than the trading volume generated by short-horizon traders. This is so because 
private information alone causes some disagreement among long-horizon traders about the 
fundamental value of the asset but causes no disagreement among short-horizon traders about the 
beliefs of long-horizon traders. 
When they have both private and public information, we find that the trading volume 
generated by long-horizon traders decreases while the trading volume generated by short-horizon 
traders increases. This is so because public information decreases the disagreement among the 
long-horizon traders about the fundamental value. However, given our information structure, it 
increases disagreement among short-horizon traders about the long-horizon traders’ beliefs about 
the fundamental value. 
We contribute to a vast stream of literature that attempts to explain the puzzling 
phenomenon of vast trading volume around earnings announcement and more generally, around 
release of public information. Two broad groups of theoretical explanations attempt at resolving 
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this puzzle. The first one (Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997)) models public information as a 
combination of public and private signals. A public announcement stimulates superior information 
processing by sophisticated investors. This induces or exacerbates information asymmetry and 
thereby, leads to increased trading volume. The second one (Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv 
(1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995)) assumes that agents have heterogeneous priors so that even 
when they process the same public signal they end up with different valuations about the 
fundamental value of the asset. These differing valuations, in turn, lead to an increased trading 
volume. 
More recently, Kondor (2012) exploits higher order expectations in financial markets to 
explain increased trading volume around public announcements. This paper combines the common 
prior assumption from the first group of papers with the characterization of public information as 
a public signal from the second group of papers. It shows that as long as there are at least some 
short-horizon traders who focus on the future market price instead of fundamental value of the 
asset, public announcement increases trading volume because it increases disagreement among 
short-horizon traders by polarizing their beliefs about the market price. We provide experimental 
evidence in support of this. 
Our paper is related to Gallo (2017). She uses archival data to examine the role of higher-
order disagreement in shaping investor beliefs while we use controlled laboratory experiment to 
examine the role of such disagreement in driving trading volume. More specifically, her primary 
variable of interest is disagreement among traders while our primary variable of interest is the 
trading volume such disagreement generates. Trading volume may be generated by disagreement 
among traders but archival data makes it difficult to disentangle trading volume from disagreement 
among traders (Banerjee (2011), Fischer, Kim and Zhou (2019)). Our controlled laboratory setting 
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allows us to disentangle these two and additionally, allows us to directly measure both the 
disagreement regarding the fundamental value and the disagreement regarding other traders’ 
beliefs about the fundamental value. 
Our experiment’s design features a fundamental value that is additive in two components. 
There are two groups of traders and each receives a noisy private signal about only one of the two 
components. A natural real-world counterpart of this set-up is a firm that operates in multiple 
geographical locations. For example, a multinational firm may operate in California and in Hong 
Kong. The investors in California would arguably know more about the firm’s operations in 
California while the investors in Hong Kong would know more about its operations in Hong Kong. 
Just as in our experiment, the firm’s publicly disclosed earnings number would be a noisy signal 
of the aggregate operation. It can be argued that while our information structure enables a 
parsimonious operationalization of differential trading horizons in a continuous double auction, it 
is stylized. Future work can examine the relation between public information, trading horizon and 
trading volume in a setting with a more general information structure. 
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Table 1 – Aggregate Trading Volume for Each Treatment 
 
The columns labeled ‘long-horizon traders’ give the aggregate trading volume generated by long-
horizon traders while the columns labeled ‘short-horizon traders’ give the aggregate trading 
volume generated by short-horizon traders. The aggregation is across 36 trading rounds over 3 
sessions for each treatment.  
 
Panel A – Aggregate Trading Volume Measured as Quantity Traded 
 
 Long-Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 minutes) 
Short-Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 minutes) 
Long-Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 minutes) 
Short-Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 minutes) 
Private Info 
Only 
3304 1197 1500 
 
500 
Private & 
Public Info 
1368 1578 490 745 
 
Panel B – Aggregate Trading Volume Measured as Price Times Quantity Traded 
 
 Long-Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 minutes) 
Short-Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 minutes) 
Long-Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 minutes) 
Short-Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 minutes) 
Private Info 
Only 
307343 
 
116347 
 
142430 48956 
Private & 
Public Info 
147346 
 
189657 
 
51608 88763 
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Panel C – Long-Horizon Trading Volume as a Linear Function of Availability of Public 
Information 
 
Regression summary statistics from the regression of long-horizon trading volume on the 
availability of public information. Note that public information is a binary variable that is set equal 
to one if public information is available and is set equal to zero if public information is not 
available. We have 72 observation of long-horizon trading volume – 36 with public information 
and 36 without. 
 
 Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Public 
Information 
-53.7778*** 
(20.6509) 
-4444.361** 
(2031.928) 
-28.0556** 
(13.6112) 
-2522.833* 
(1428.511) 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 36 
Periods 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect 
for Session 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors 
Clustered at 
Session Level 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7260 0.6662 0.6546 0.6171 
N 72 72 72 72 
***, **, * indicate significantly different from 0 at p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Robust standard error in parentheses. The regressions include a random effect for session and a 
fixed effect for each of the 36 periods. Standard errors are clustered at the session level. 
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Panel D – Short Horizon Trading Volume as a Linear Function of Availability of Public 
Information 
 
Regression summary statistics from the regression of short-horizon trading volume on te 
availability of public information. Note that public information is a binary variable that is set equal 
to one if public information is available and is set equal to zero if public information is not 
available. We have 72 observation of short-horizon trading volume – 36 with public information 
and 36 without. 
 
 Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Public 
Information 
10.5833*** 
(3.3405) 
2036.389** 
(842.234) 
6.8056*** 
(2.2967) 
1105.75*** 
(412.3064) 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 36 
Periods 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect 
for Session 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors 
Clustered at 
Session Level 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.8619 0.7823 0.8369 0.8110 
N 72 72 72 72 
***, **, * indicate significantly different from 0 at p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Robust standard error in parentheses. The regressions include a random effect for session and a 
fixed effect for each of the 36 periods. Standard errors are clustered at the session level. 
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Table 2 – Aggregate Trading Volume for the First Four Trading Periods and the Last Four 
Trading Periods of Each Session of Each Treatment 
 
The columns labeled ‘long-horizon traders’ give the aggregate trading volume generated by long-
horizon traders while the columns labeled ‘short-horizon traders’ give the aggregate trading 
volume generated by short-horizon traders. The aggregation is across the first 4 trading rounds and 
the last 4 trading rounds for each session of each treatment.  
 
Panel A – Aggregate Trading Volume Measured as Quantity Traded 
 
 Trading 
Periods 
Session Long-
Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Short-
Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Long-
Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Short-
Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Private 
Info Only 
First Four 
Periods 
I 390 92 170 30 
II 240 112 100 44 
III 289 186 145 97 
Last Four 
Periods 
I 469 120 171 53 
II 107 70 22 17 
III 665 228 381 88 
Private & 
Public 
Info 
First Four 
Periods 
I 226 178 90 86 
II 177 119 64 55 
III 113 278 52 128 
Last Four 
Periods 
I 165 169 57 93 
II 101 78 28 28 
III 129 235 34 120 
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Panel B – Aggregate Trading Volume Measured as Price Times Quantity Traded 
 
The columns labeled ‘long-horizon traders’ give the aggregate trading volume generated by long-
horizon traders while the columns labeled ‘short-horizon traders’ give the aggregate trading 
volume generated by short-horizon traders. The aggregation is across the first 4 trading rounds and 
the last 4 trading rounds for each session of each treatment.  
 
 Trading 
Periods 
Session Long-
Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Short-
Horizon 
Traders 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Long-
Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Short-
Horizon 
Traders 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Private 
Info Only 
First Four 
Periods 
I 31949 7749 13521 2518 
II 25463 10241 11125 4163 
III 27571 18546 14200 9942 
Last Four 
Periods 
I 36125 11706 13201 5175 
II 10898 7541 2179 1823 
III 69537 22801 40241 8945 
Private & 
Public 
Info 
First Four 
Periods 
I 24859 22377 9932 11648 
II 20457 10943 7192 5058 
III 11554 40891 5141 18443 
Last Four 
Periods 
I 16876 18536 5605 10211 
II 10667 8076 2879 2845 
III 14043 24956 3746 12098 
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Panel C – Results from Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Trading Volume for Each Treatment  
 
For each session of treatment, we aggregated the trading volume for first four trading rounds and 
for last four trading rounds. As we ran three sessions of each treatment, we were able to get six 
trading volume observations for each treatment.  (N = 6) 
 
 Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Trading 
Volume 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 minutes) 
Hypothesis z-
score 
p-
value 
z-
score 
p-
value 
z-
score 
p-
value 
z-
score 
p-
value 
Private 
information only – 
trading volume 
among long-
horizon traders = 
trading volume 
among short-
horizon traders 
2.201 0.0277 2.201 0.0277 2.201 0.0277 2.201 0.0277 
Long-horizon 
traders – trading 
volume with 
private and public 
info = trading 
volume with 
private info only 
-2.201 0.0277 -2.201 0.0277 -1.992 0.0464 -1.992 0.0464 
Short-horizon 
traders – trading 
volume with 
private and public 
info = trading 
volume with 
private info only 
2.207 0.0273 2.201 0.0277 2.207 0.0273 2.201 0.0277 
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Table 3 – Disagreement Among Traders 
 
Panel A – Average Disagreement Among Traders 
 
For each of the 36 trading periods, five traders received a low private signal while five traders 
received a high private signal. We averaged the forecast made by the five traders with the low 
signal and averaged the forecast made by the five traders with the high signal. We measured the 
disagreement among traders as the absolute difference between these two averages. This table 
reports the average disagreement across 36 observations. The medians are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Long-Horizon Traders Short-Horizon Traders 
Private Info Only 9.66 
(7.4) 
9.39 
(6.6) 
Private & Public Info 4.8 
(3.0) 
9.42 
(8) 
 
Panel B – Time Weighted Bid-Ask Spread 
 
This panel reports the average time weighted bid-ask spread across 36 observations. The medians 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Long-Horizon Traders Short-Horizon Traders 
Private Info Only 28.48 
(16.56) 
 
15.59 
(11.96) 
Private & Public Info 9.53 
(8.25) 
 
25.01 
(19.33) 
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Panel C – Disagreement Among Long-Horizon Traders and Time Weighted Bid-Ask Spread 
Among Long-Horizon Traders as a Linear Function of Availability of Public Information 
 
Regression summary statistics from the regression of disagreement among long-horizon traders on 
the availability of public information and of time-weighted bid-ask spread among long-horizon 
traders on the availability of public information. Note that Public Information is a binary variable 
that is set equal to one if public information is available and is set equal to zero if public 
information is not available.  
 
 Disagreement 
Among Long-
Horizon Traders 
Time Weighted 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Among Long-
Horizon Traders 
Public Information -4.8587*** 
(1.338) 
-18.9551** 
(8.93) 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 36 
Periods 
Yes Yes 
Random Effect for 
Session 
Yes Yes 
Standard Errors 
Clustered at Session 
Level 
Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.6895 0.6991 
N 72 72 
***, **, * indicate significantly different from 0 at p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Robust standard error in parentheses. The regressions include a random effect for session and a 
fixed effect for each of the 36 periods. Standard errors are clustered at the session level. 
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Panel D – Disagreement Among Short-Horizon Traders and Time Weighted Bid-Ask Spread 
Among Short-Horizon Traders as a Linear Function of Availability of Public Information 
 
Regression summary statistics from the regression of disagreement among short-horizon traders 
on the availability of public information and of time-weighted bid-ask spread among short-horizon 
traders on the availability of public information. Note that Public Information is a binary variable 
that is set equal to one if public information is available and is set equal to zero if public 
information is not available.  
 
 Disagreement 
Among Short-
Horizon Traders 
Time Weighted 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Among Short-
Horizon Traders 
Public Information 0.0278 
(1.8575) 
9.4237* 
(5.5336) 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 36 
Periods 
Yes Yes 
Random Effect for 
Session 
Yes Yes 
Standard Errors 
Clustered at Session 
Level 
Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7367 0.8214 
N 72 72 
***, **, * indicate significantly different from 0 at p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Robust standard error in parentheses. The regressions include a random effect for session and a 
fixed effect for each of the 36 periods. Standard errors are clustered at the session level. 
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Table 4 – Standard Deviation of Prices and Forecasts 
 Prices Forecasts 
 Long-Horizon 
Traders 
Short-Horizon 
Traders 
Long-Horizon 
Traders 
Short-Horizon 
Traders 
Private Info 
Only 
29.01 
(N = 3304) 
14.98 
(N = 1197) 
17.98 18.75 
Private & 
Public Info 
13.45 
(N = 1368) 
29.8 
(N=1578) 
15.81 19.74 
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Table 5 – Participant-Level Trades as a Linear Function of Availability of Public 
Information 
 
Panel A – Long-Horizon Participant-Level Trades as a Linear Function of Availability of 
Public Information 
 
Regression summary statistics from the regression of long-horizon participant-level trades on 
availability of public information. Note that public information is a binary variable that is set equal 
to one if public information is available and is set equal to zero if public information is not 
available.  
 
 Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 minutes) 
Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Public 
Information 
-13** 
(5.9414) 
-804.7833* 
(427.7645) 
-5.25** 
(2.1692) 
-333.0333** 
(154.6407) 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 36 
Periods 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 6 
Sessions 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect 
for Participant 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors 
Clustered at 
Participant Level 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.2243 0.2041 0.2407 0.2330 
N 720 720 720 720 
***, **, * indicate significantly different from 0 at p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Robust standard error in parentheses. The regressions include a random effect for participant, a 
fixed effect for each of the 36 periods and a fixed effect for each of the 6 sessions. Standard errors 
are clustered at the participant level. 
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Panel B – Short Horizon Participant-Level Trades as a Linear Function of Availability of 
Public Information 
 
Regression summary statistics from the regression of short-horizon participant-level trades on 
availability of public information. Note that public information is a binary variable that is set equal 
to one if public information is available and is set equal to zero if public information is not 
available.  
 
 Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 
minutes) 
Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(all 4 minutes) 
Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Participant-
Level Trades 
Measured as 
Price Times 
Quantity 
Traded 
(last 2 
minutes) 
Public 
Information 
2.8667 
(2.95) 
456.9167 
(330.971) 
2.1667 
(1.4744) 
310.3833* 
(180.3452) 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 36 
Periods 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect for 
Each of the 6 
Sessions 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effect 
for Participant 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors 
Clustered at 
Participant Level 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1966 0.2691 0.2451 0.2461 
N 720 720 720 720 
***, **, * indicate significantly different from 0 at p < 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Robust standard error in parentheses. The regressions include a random effect for participant, a 
fixed effect for each of the 36 periods and a fixed effect for each of the 6 sessions. Standard errors 
are clustered at the participant level. 
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Figure 3 – Volume Weighted Average Price 
 
Panel A – Volume Weighted Average Price Among Long-Horizon Traders 
 
 
 
Panel B – Volume Weighted Average Price Among Short-Horizon Traders 
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Figure 4 – Mean Absolute Deviation from Liquidating Value 
 
Panel A – Mean Absolute Deviation from Liquidating Value Among Long-Horizon Traders 
 
 
 
Panel B – Mean Absolute Deviation from Liquidating Value Among Short-Horizon Traders 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 2: |𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑖) − 𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑗)| =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃,𝑥)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑥)
|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗|, and 
𝐸(𝜃|𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐸(𝜃|𝑦) +
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃,𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑥|𝑦)
[𝑥 − 𝐸(𝑥|𝑦)]. So,  
|𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦) − 𝐸(𝜃|𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦)| =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃,𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑥|𝑦)
|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗|  
The proposition then follows if, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃,𝑥|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑥|𝑦)
<
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃,𝑥)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑥)
 
But, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃, 𝑥|𝑦) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴 + 𝜃𝐵 , 𝜃𝐵 + 𝜀|𝑦) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝜃𝐵|𝑦) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵|𝑦). So, the desired 
inequality is equivalent to: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝜃𝐵|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵|𝑦) + 𝜎𝜀2
+
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵|𝑦) + 𝜎𝜀2
<
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝜃𝐵) + 𝜎𝜀2
 
This last inequality is true due to the fact that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝐴, 𝜃𝐵|𝑦) < 0 and 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵|𝑦)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵|𝑦)+𝜎𝜀
2 <
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝜃𝐵)+𝜎𝜀
2 because 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵|𝑦) <  𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃𝐵). 
Appendix B  
Instructions for Short-Horizon Public Information Available Treatment 
 
Instructions Part 1 - Introduction 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making.  You will be paid in cash 
at the end of the experiment based upon the decisions you make, so it is important that you understand 
these instructions.  If you have a question, please raise your hand and a monitor will approach you.  
Otherwise, you should not communicate in any way with anyone else.   
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you can buy and sell shares 
with other participants in the experiment.  The currency is called Experimental Currency Units 
(ECUs) and at the end of the experiment your ECUs will be converted into $US at the rate $1 = 2500 
ECUs. 
 
Your task 
38  
The experiment is broken up into multiple 4-minute trading periods. Each period you can trade 
(buy and/or sell) shares.  At the end of a trading period, each share you own will be sold to a robot 
trader.  This robot is not allowed to buy and sell shares during the period – it will only buy all shares 
from you at the end of the trading period.  The robot trader will pay you its best estimate of the actual 
end-of-period share value for each share it buys from you.  The shares will then expire.  In a given 
trading period, the robot trader will pay all participants the same amount for each share. 
 During the trading period, you will not know the amount each share is worth, but you will 
receive two clues about this amount before the market trading period begins. After you have received 
your clues, you will be given 30 seconds to make a forecast of the amount the robot trader will 
pay for each share at the end of the period. 
At the end of each period, you will be rewarded in ECUs for each of your forecasts. The 
more accurate your forecasts, the higher your reward will be.  A timeline of the sequence of 
events in each period is as follows.  
 
 
 
 
 
You will start each year with a balance of $3,600 ECUs and 4 shares.  Any time you buy a 
share, your share balance increases by 1 and the price you pay is deducted from your ECU balance.  
Any time you sell a share, your share balance decreases by 1 and the sale price is added to your balance.  
At the end of the period, your share will be sold to the robot trader, and this amount will be added to 
your ECU balance. 
Additionally, your reward from making the pre-trading forecasts will also be added to your 
balance. Your earnings for the period are based on your final ECU balance.  ECUs and shares do not 
carry over from one period to the next.  This means that if you end period 1 with 100 ECUs and 2 
shares, then you will still begin period 2 with $3,600 ECUs and 4 shares.     
 
How end-of-period share values are determined 
The end-of-period share value is the sum of two components, which will be denoted by colored 
tokens: RED tokens and BLUE tokens. That is, the end-of-period share value is the total number of 
Trading 
(4 minutes) 
End-of-period share 
value realized; 
payoffs on share 
holdings and for 
pre-trading 
forecasts distributed 
Receive clues 
about the end-
of-period share 
value 
Pre-trading 
Forecast 
(30 seconds) 
39  
RED and BLUE tokens. 
The number of RED and BLUE tokens are uncertain and independent of each other. Each 
of these two quantities is determined by independent random draws from the bell-shaped distribution 
in the figure below. Although the exact number of RED tokens in the end-of-period share value will 
vary from drawing to drawing, on average (over many, many drawings) the number of RED tokens 
will be about 50 and the dispersion around this average is 10.   
 
 
The above data implies that, in the absence of additional information, you can be 67% 
confident that the number of RED tokens in the end-of-period share value is in the range of 40 to 60, 
and you can be 95% confident that it is in the range 30 to 70.   
For example, the probability that the number of RED tokens in the end-of-period share value 
is 50 is approximately 4%, while the probability that the number of RED tokens in the end-of-period 
share value is 70 is approximately 0.5%. 
The number of BLUE tokens contained in the end-of-period share value is also uncertain, but 
has exactly the same features as the number of RED tokens.  Thus, on average the number of BLUE 
tokens is also 50 and the dispersion around the average is 10.  The number of BLUE tokens that is 
drawn from this distribution is independent of the number of RED tokens drawn from the distribution.   
For each trading period, the computer randomly drew the number of RED tokens from the 
RED distribution and independently drew the number of BLUE tokens from the BLUE distribution.  
The computer then added the number of RED tokens drawn to the number of BLUE tokens drawn.  
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This sum is the end-of-period share value that will be announced at the end of the trading period.  
The end-of-period share value in every trading period is determined independently of previous end-
of-period share values.   
RED tokens + BLUE tokens = End-of-Period share value 
 
Summary – Part 1 
There will be a short quiz followed by a practice period to allow everyone to become familiar 
with entering offers and making trades, but before we do let’s review the main points of the 
experiment. 
1. Each period you will start off with 3,600 ECUs and 4 shares.   
2. The shares you hold at the end of a trading period will be sold to a robot trader.  The robot 
trader will pay you what it believes the actual end-of-period share value is.  This value is not 
necessarily equal to the actual end-of-period share value. 
3. You will not know the end-of-period share value, which is the sum of two components, 
namely RED tokens and BLUE tokens. But, you will receive two clues about this value. 
4. After you receive the clues but before trading in the market commences, you will make a 
forecast of the amount the robot trader will pay you for each share you hold at the end of 
the period (that is, the robot trader’s belief of the end-of-period share value). 
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Instructions Part 2 - Clues about the end-of-period share value 
At the beginning of each trading period each of you will receive two clues. One of the clues will 
be about the number of RED tokens in the end-of-period share value and this clue will be provided to you 
confidentially. The other clue will be about the sum of the number of RED tokens and number of BLUE 
tokens contained in the end-of-period share value and this clue will be publicly provided to all participants.  
The robot trader will receive a clue about the number of BLUE tokens contained in the end-of-
period share value but it will not receive the public clue about the sum of the number of RED tokens and 
number of BLUE tokens contained in the end-of-period share value.  The clue received by the robot trader 
is perfect so that it knows the exact number of BLUE tokens contained in the end-of-period share value. 
The clues you receive are not necessarily perfect, but are useful in making your own subjective 
judgments about the end-of-period share value in that trading period.  For each trading period the 
computer draws two confidential clues from the clue distribution for RED tokens that is described below. 
One of these two clues is randomly given to one-half of the participants and the other clue is given to the 
other half of the participants.  
The confidential clue that you receive each period is equal to the number of RED tokens that was 
actually drawn from the RED distribution for that trading period plus a random error. The error is a 
drawing from the bell-shaped distribution in the figure below. On average (roughly 8% of the time) 
the error is 0 (meaning your clue tells you the exact number of RED tokens) and the dispersion 
around the average is 5.  
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To illustrate what this means, suppose: 
 Example 1 Example 2 
Actual # of RED tokens drawn by computer 40 60 
67% chance your confidential clue is in range 35 to 45 55 to 65 
95% chance your confidential clue is in range 30 to 50 50 to 70 
5% chance your confidential clue is Greater than 50 Greater than 70 
5% chance your confidential clue is Less than 30 Less than 50 
 
Public clues about the end-of-period share value 
Recall that the public clue is a clue about the total end-of-period share value, i.e. about the 
sum of RED and BLUE tokens.  As with the confidential clue, the public clue also contains random 
error.  The public clue is determined as follows.  The number of RED tokens drawn by the computer 
is added to the number of BLUE tokens drawn by the computer and then a randomly drawn error 
term is added to this total.  The random error term in the public clue is independent of the random 
error term in the confidential clues.   
The error in the public clue is drawn from the bell-shaped distribution in the figure below. 
The average of this error is 0 and the dispersion of the error around the average is 5.  
 
To illustrate what this means, suppose: 
 Example 1 Example 2 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
-15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15
Deviation of your clue from the actual number of RED tokens 
contained in the end-of-period share value
Error Term
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Actual # of RED tokens drawn by computer 40 80 
Actual # of BLUE tokens drawn by computer 60 40 
End-of-period share value 100 120 
67% chance the public clue is in range 95 to 105 115 to 125 
95% chance the public clue is in range 90 to 110 110 to 130 
5% chance the public clue is Greater than 110 Greater than 130 
5% chance the public clue is Less than 90 Less than 110 
 
Pre-trading Forecast Earnings 
 Your payoff for your pre-trading forecast is determined by a scoring rule.  The formula is 
a little complicated, but what it means is that you maximize your expected payment by correctly 
guessing the amount the robot trader will pay you for each share at the end of the period.  The 
formula is: 
Your payoff = max{ 0,  2500 – 0.25× 
[ (your forecast) – (amount robot trader will pay you) ]2}.  
Suppose the amount the robot trader will pay you for each share is 100.  If you guess a value of 
80, then your payoff would be: 
Your payoff = max{ 0, 2500 – 0.25×[ (80) – (100) ]2} = 2400 ECU.  
If you correctly guess the amount of 100 that the robot trader will pay you for this example, then 
your payoff would be 
Your payoff = max{ 0, 2500 – 0.25×[ (100) – (100) ]2} = 2500 ECU, 
which is the maximum payoff you can earn for a forecast.  Again, although the formula is a bit 
complicated it is structured so that you maximize your expected payment by correctly forecasting 
the actual amount the robot trader will pay you.  Also note that your payoff cannot be negative. 
Screenshots of the pre- and post-trading forecasting pages are below (assuming you 
forecasted 80 and the robot’s estimate of the end-of-period share value was 100). 
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Summary – Part 2 
There will be a short quiz followed by a practice period to allow everyone to become familiar 
with entering offers and making trades, but before we do let’s review the main points of the 
experiment. 
1. You will receive two clues.  You will receive a confidential clue about the number of RED 
tokens contained in the end-of-period share value.  All participants will also receive the same 
public clue about the end-of-period share value (total number of RED and BLUE tokens).  
The clues are not necessarily perfect but are informative.  The robot trader will receive a 
perfect clue about the number of BLUE tokens contained in the end-of-period share value so 
that it knows the exact number of BLUE tokens contained in the end-of-period share value. 
The robot trader will not receive the public clue. 
2. After you receive the clues but before trading in the market commences, you will make a 
forecast of the amount the robot trader will pay you for each share at the end of the period.  
This amount is equal to the robot trader’s belief of the actual end-of-period share value. 
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Instructions Part 3 - Computer Interface 
Now that you have an overview of the experiment, we will talk in more detail about how you 
buy and sell shares.  A table at the right hand side of your screen will show  
Your Holdings of ECUs and shares in the current period. 
 
The bottom right portion of your screen will display whatever information you have about the 
value of a share including clues.   
 
Buying and Selling Shares 
Each period, you can buy or sell shares from one another by making offers to buy or to sell. 
Every time someone makes an offer to buy a share, a GREEN dot will appear in the Market Chart 
on the left side of your screen.  Every time someone makes an offer to sell, an ORANGE dot will 
appear on the graph. Offers are also listed in the Market Book to the right of the graph. The offers 
to buy will be listed in ascending order in GREEN, while the offers to sell will be listed in descending 
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order in ORANGE. Once a trade is actually made, the trade will be shown as a BLACK dot in the 
graph. Whoever bought the share will pay the agreed upon price to whoever sold the share.  The 
person who sold the share will receive this payment.  The buyer’s number of shares will increase by 
one and the seller’s number of shares will decrease by one. You cannot buy shares unless you have 
enough ECUs in your holdings to pay for it.  You cannot sell a share if you do not have one in your 
holdings.  To help you know if you have enough ECUs in your holdings to pay for a share, you may 
look at the Available Cash field.  It reflects the difference of your current ECUs holdings and your 
Cash needed to cover current Offers to Buy, which represents the sum of all of your current Offers 
to Buy.  Note that if you cancel an Offer to Buy, then your Cash needed to cover current Offers to 
Buy will decrease and your Available Cash will increase.  Also, your end-of-period earnings are 
based upon your ECUs holdings – not your Available Cash. 
 
The Market Actions section shows you the best prices to buy, or sell, that are currently 
available on the market.  To accept an existing offer from another participant, simply click the Sell 
Now or Buy Now button.  In this example, the lowest offer to sell is 90 and the highest offer to buy 
is 72.  By clicking on the Buy Now button, you buy at the listed price (90); by clicking on the Sell 
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Now button, you sell at the listed price (72).    
 
To propose your own price to buy or sell, you simply type the price at which you would like 
to buy or sell, in the appropriate box and click the corresponding Offer to Buy or Offer to Sell button. 
When you press Offer to Buy or Offer to Sell you are agreeing to trade a share at that price.  
Your offer will appear on the graph and in the Market Book (see Market Chart above).  
Your offers to buy or sell will also appear on buttons at the bottom of the Market Actions 
section.  Clicking this button will remove your offers from the market (see Market Actions above).  
At the end of each Period, the Period Information section will display the number of shares 
you currently hold, the amount the robot trader will pay you for each share, and your ECU balance, 
which is calculated as: 
Ending ECU Balance = Shares × Amount robot trader will pay for each share + ECUs 
Cumulative Profits reflects the sum of your trading profits from the current period as well as all 
previous periods.  
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Summary – Part 3 
There will be a short quiz followed by a practice period to allow everyone to become familiar 
with entering offers and making trades, but before we do let’s review the main points of the 
experiment. 
1. Each period you will start off with 3,600 ECUs and 4 shares.   
2. You can buy and sell shares in the market.  Offer to Buy (Offer to Sell) is used to announce a 
price at which you want to buy (sell) if someone else will accept.  Buy Now (Sell Now) is 
used to instantly buy (sell) a share at a price offered by another trader in the market.   
3. Your earnings in a period = your initial ECUs + ECUs you receive from selling shares – ECUs 
you spend buying shares + amount the robot trader pays you for buying shares you hold at the 
end of the period + reward for making your pre-trading forecast  
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Quiz 
1. The end-of-period share value is a sum of two components: RED tokens and BLUE 
tokens. T / F 
2. You will receive a confidential clue about the number of RED tokens in the end-of-
period share value. T / F 
3. The robot trader will receive a confidential clue about the number of RED tokens in 
the end-of-period share value. T / F 
a. Explanation: The robot trader will receive a confidential clue about the 
number of BLUE tokens in the end-of-period share value.  Note that while 
your confidential clue does not inform you of the exact number of RED 
tokens in the end-of-period share value, the robot’s confidential clue 
informs it of the exact number of BLUE tokens in the end-of-period share 
value. 
4. The confidential clue you receive perfectly reveals the number of RED tokens 
contained in the end-of-period share value. T / F 
a. Explanation: Your confidential clue does not necessarily inform you of the 
exact number of RED tokens in the end-of-period share value.  It is 
informative, but does not necessarily perfectly reveal the number of RED 
tokens in the end-of-period share value. 
5. The confidential clue the robot trader receives perfectly reveals the number of BLUE 
tokens contained in the end-of-period share value. T / F 
6. One-half of the participants will receive the same confidential clue. T / F 
7. The public clue is a clue about the end-of-period share value, i.e. about the sum of 
RED and BLUE. T / F 
8. The public clue you receive perfectly reveals the end-of-period share value. T / F 
a. Explanation: All human traders receive the same public clue regarding 
the end-of-period share value.  This clue is informative but does not 
necessarily inform you of the precise end-of-period share value.  Note that 
the robot trader does not receive this public clue. 
9. Can you use ECUs from one period for trading in the subsequent periods? Y / N  
10. Can you buy more shares than your current cash (ECU) holding allows? Y / N 
